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BUDDHIST ECONOMICS
The key thing that the Buddha taught is the possibility and the 
desirability of enlightenment.
Enlightenment is a transcendental experience; it is a psychological- 
physiological series of states (13). It is an experience or an achievement 
of an individual, but at the same time it is a process—a path with 
dynamics of its own (8). Enlightenment in the former, static, one- 
pointed personalistic sense finds the individual in his religious or 
spiritual type of activity and has no economic dimensions. In the latter, 
dynamic sense, however, it does.
In the Buddhist tradition, experiences of enlightenment are to be 
followed by conscious meditation practice and by ethical activity, so 
that these experiences can be more deeply ingrained and of continuous 
benefit to the person himself and to society.
Identification with others is cultivated by Buddhists in 
meditations specifically devoted to the heightening of capaci­
ty for loving-kindness and the corollary virtues, compassion, 
joy in the joy of others, and impartiality (9;388).
Philip Kapleau, in Zen in the West (8), brings out the important prac­
tical point that the whole procedure of after-enlightenment practice is 
conditioned by the society, the economy, and all aspects of the in­
dividual^ environment. The assumption of rebirth also brings goals 
for the future with personal concern: a task left undone here and now 
will be faced again under more difficult circumstances.
A Buddhist Economics, then, can be defined as that type of 
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economics which stems from or keeps continuing the experience of 
enlightenment or that which provides a ground which sustains or con­
tributes to enlightenment. Buddhist Economics defined in this way is as 
totally universal as it is totally individual: all the great religions 
recognize an experience of enlightenment and each individual ex­
periences enlightenment as a point on the Path.
The importance of enlightenment to Buddhists has resulted, in their 
texts, in a naming and classifying of nirvana. Of the many, 
Apratishthita (without ceasing) nirvana is one type which has some 
relevance to our discussion here as it has its parallels in Western 
literature. It may be translated as “altruistic” or “dynamic” nirvana; 
it is a state of inner quietness and great outer activity. In Buddhism, 
this type of nirvana is a completely ethical concept (4; 108) according to 
which the liberated person, no longer swayed by samsara (all that is of 
this world), continues to act for the good of all beings.
This type of activity for other beings is perfectly rational from the 
point of view of an enlightened individual. It is not only the only thing 
to do, it is the thing to do: the way to “hang out” while awaiting 
parinirvana (the final “exit”).
The raison d’etre for Buddhist Economics is relating the experience 
of enlightenment to the facts of economy and expressing this ex­
perience in the science of economics. The experience of enlightenment, 
as we noted above, is a universal one, but internal and non-verbal. 
Some of its elements, however, often affect the economic behavior of 
individuals and the decisions of major and less important policy­
makers. A Buddhist Economics is thus a meta-economics which can 
provide the science of Economics with an ethical nuance.
In a way, it might be equally appropriate to talk about the 
Economics of Enlightenment or Transcendental Economics, but we 
have chosen to use Buddhist as an adjective because this adjective itself 
can be seen as universal. For the economist, it neither contradicts the 
teachings of other major philosophies or religions nor is laden with 
many popular or unpopular associations. Yet, it contains certain 
ethical and moral motivating forces, found in the Buddhist sources and 
scriptures, which may guide individuals in their behavior.
Some may argue that such an economics has a limited scope. But 
Buddhist Economics is also relevant in those economic situations in 
which people behave as if they are enlightened or are working hard 
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towards that objective, however they envision it, on their own. The 
world, with all its sentient beings, according to Buddhist doctrine, 
tends toward salvation or nirvana in the long run; all the activities we 
pursue bring us closer to that goal. A Buddhist Economics consistent 
with that doctrine would expedite this process.
USES OF BUDDHIST ECONOMICS
Schumacher's book Small is Beautiful (15b) was a milestone in the 
West. It attracted the attention of some economists to the fact that the 
principles of the great Indian tradition do find creative and active ex­
pression in the contemporary world of economics.
In Sri Lanka the Sarvodaya Movement, inspired by modernized prin­
ciples in the Buddhist tradition, is channeling the energies of the rural 
villages and communities towards improvements in education, systems 
of public facilities, and agricultural development.
And in India, there are reports of their restructuring and remodeling 
various production technologies so that the process of investment, 
capital accumulation, and growth takes into account not only produc­
tivity ratios but also the social and human aspects of the communities 
in which the investment is taking place.
In the United States there are even a few specifically Buddhist 
“islands” in the economy, such as restaurants, stitcheries, bakeries, 
etc., the objectives of which are to provide employment and practical 
opportunities for Buddhists to express—in the area of work—that 
which they have learned in their religious and spiritual practice. An at­
tempt is being made to run these enterprises in a careful fashion, using 
all of the knowledge and information which Americans traditionally 
can use. Yet it has not been the intent of these enterprises to maximize 
profit. In some cases, we in fact have examples to the contrary. The cor­
ner Buddhist green-grocer is giving bonuses to his customers at the end 
of his accounting year.
By 1976 it was said that there were about half a million people in the 
United States who could be considered as practicing Buddhists. (10). 
There are also many others who choose to lead a “Buddhist” life of 
voluntary simplicity. Yet, on the whole, the Buddhist economy in the 
United States is only a small part of a mixed economy.
Since the American country’s economy is not Buddhist, to construct 
an explicitly Buddhist Economics to be used there may be interesting 
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and feasible but not immediately useful. Yet the Buddhist in America, 
and elsewhere, does need guidelines or principles for decision-making 
in an environment which is non-Buddhist and which, in the economic 
arena, employs principles, criteria, and calculations which are, or at 
the very least appear to be, “incompatible.”
One of the uses, thus, of Buddhist Economics is to provide a list of 
operational tools which can affect decision-making. A second use of 
Buddhist Economics is educational. It tells a Buddhist individual that a 
Buddhist or a near Buddhist type of economic activity—right liveli­
hood—can be pursued.
On the other hand, Buddhist Economics can teach a non-Buddhist 
type of individual that, in addition to the principles of economics 
taught in the classroom, there are ethical premises, assumptions, 
criteria, and motives which can result in the formation of prices, quan­
tities, exchange, employment, and output: economic activity.
This kind of information, we feel, is not only interesting and con­
structive to the development of new areas in economic, but also useful 
to individuals and to the performance of an economic system as a 
whole. It may help to answer the rising demand by some for new objec­
tives—for a new definition of economics.
Decision-Making and Economics
The science of the art of decision-making is a general one. It is in the 
better nature of individuals to make decisions which are both rational 
and beneficial to them and to avoid making stupid and unproductive 
decisions. If one were to analyze the life history of any one decision, it 
would quickly become dear that it involved many considerations— 
ethical, psychological, sodological, economic, etc.
We often speak of economic decision-making, however, in isolation 
from other aspects of decision-making. What we wish to discuss here is 
“Buddhist” decision-making—that which is based on the normative 
principles; Buddhist decision-making criteria embodied in economics; 
economic decision-making as it can be useful to society, (lb, lc).
In a discussion of Buddhist decision-making, we are attempting to 
answer some question which may arise in confronting the reality of 
situations, for economic decisions are not made in isolation from other 
decisions; they are part of total desires. What we have are dedsions 
coming from internal and external motives which have economic 
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aspects and have economic ramifications. To be useful to people, 
economics could expand its own boundaries by including the nor­
mative and enter the area of meta-decision-making or meta-economics.
This type of economics would accompany the type of decision-mak­
ing which has been and is taking place. This acitivity can be seen in 
some decision-makers’ “words,” types of words often absent from the 
vocabulary of contemporary economics. But they have been, and they 
can again be part of its arsenal.
BUDDHIST DECISION-MAKERS
Asoka
Emperor Asoka, a Buddhist “philosopher king,” is one of the 
clearest examples of a Buddhist decision-maker. Following the “law of 
dharma,” a morality based on the Buddhist paramitas or “perfec­
tions” (compassion, charity, restraint, firm faith, truth, purity, humili­
ty, forbearance, and non-violence (5; 112)), Asoka, in his Rock and 
Pillar Edicts, attempted to make moral policy for his people. Moral 
principles were to be embodied in laws and manifested in behavior.
Thus, Asoka mixed policy directives—to set up hospitals, to feed the 
poor, to render just decisions—with moral directives which reflected 
the paramitas. Ksanti (absolute forbearance), for example, was to be 
exhibited in restraint of speech,
... so that one man will not do reverence to his sect while 
disparaging another (5; 170)
Dana (giving without stint) was to be cultivated by, for example, 
almsgiving in accordance with the Law of Piety (friendship in piety, 
liberality in piety, kinship in piety), respect and reverence, and the giv­
ing of happiness, solitude and prosperity (Rock Edict XI (16; 169)).
Asoka himself, through his edicts, exhibited Virya (perseverance), 
sparing no effort in conveying the Laws of Piety and Dharma. Through 
Dhyana (undisturbed contemplation), for gaining mastery over the 
senses and purity of mind, he and his subjects could attain the bliss of 
nirvana'.
. . . intense self-examination, achieved by meditation, in­
tense effort, intense love of the law of Piety, and intense 
obedience will secure the next world. (16; 182)
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It was this law of Piety which set the high moral standard required in 
the paramita sila (perfect moral conduct) and which applied to Asoka’s 
policy of Dharma as a whole. Asoka’s Rock Edict III, for example, 
gave direct instruction to his cabinet for teaching the law of Piety and 
created a Bureau of Censors to increase welfare and inform him of in­
justices. Prajna (wisdom), of course, was important for all leaders, to
bring the people of the kingdom f •ragefully towards enlightenment and
to maintain a unified state.
In Asoka’s kingdom, the road to wisdom (based on right views, right 
feelings, right words, right behavior, right livelihood, right exertion, 
right memory, and right meditation, with tranquility) was to be follow­
ed by all decision-makers, great and small: the Rock and Pillar Edicts 
provided the guideposts. Brutality, cruelty, anger, pride, and 
jealousy—impiety—were to be avoided.
E, F. Schumacher
The economic work of E. F. Schumacher is well known. He has been 
popularly known for his advocation, in Small is Beautiful, of a Bud­
dhist economics, and of a socio-economic state in touch and in har­
mony with nature and spirit: based on the virtue of man. (15)
Schumacher is equally well known as a decision maker: for his 
criticisms of waste, disorder, destructive work patterns, development 
motivated by greed and envy, and the methodology of a materialistic 
economics which ignores man’s dependence on the natural and 
spiritual world. “Striving for non-violence,” he says, means working 
“with the gentle and incredibly efficient methods of nature” instead of 
“forcing one’s way through her.” (15c; 436).
The goals of economics, said Schumacher, should be health, beauty, 
permanence, and productivity: a simple society of simple technology. 
A meta-economics including these goals would lead to the development 
of the whole man, contributing to his personal enlightenment, and max­
imize the virtue, the utility and the happiness of all.
Schumacher’s A Guide for the Perplexed (15a) gives an almost 
metaphysical analysis of the levels of this interaction of man and his 
reality. In this analysis, he brings to play the multi-dimensions of 
thought and action, not stopping with just economics “as if people 
mattered.” As a meta-economist and a Buddhist decision maker, he 
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takes into consideration the evidence of an “inner life*' at the same 
time as the life of “action.”
He shows an active humanistic concern:
To treat a person as if he or she were a mere object is a 
perversity, not to say a crime. . . Man can achieve a measure 
of control over his environment and thereby his life, utilizing 
things around him for his own purposes. (15a;27).
To ask whether the human being has Freedom is like asking 
whether man is a millionaire. He is not, but can become, a 
millionaire. He can make it his aim to become rich; similarly, 
he can make it his aim to become free. (15a;3O).
He distinguishes between different “truths**:
Experience, and not illumination, tells us about the ex­
istence, appearance and changes of sensible things, such as 
stones, plants, animals, and people.
Illumination, and not experience, tells us what such things 
mean, what they could be, and what they perhaps ought to 
be (15a;48-9).
And he comes out strongly in favor of using both truths in any ap­
proach to study and decisions. For when illumination is neglected in 
producing knowledge, and the “higher powers” atrophy, “problems 
which society or individuals are called upon to tackle become insolu­
ble.” (15a;56).
Ideally, Schumacher says,
... the structure of a man’s knowledge would match the 
structure of reality. At the highest level there would be 
“knowledge for understanding” in its purest form; at the 
lowest there would be “knowledge for manipulation.” 
(15a;57).
This “knowledge for understanding” is to be found largely through 
“bare attention” or a single-minded awareness (the Buddha's Way of 
Mindfulness): a getting away from “I-thought,” says Schumacher. It 
is to be supplemented by self-knowledge of a different sort, reached by 
reading our own reflection in society's mirror:
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The best way to obtain the requisite knowledge about 
ourselves. . . is to observe and understand the needs, perplex­
ities, and difficulties of others, putting ourselves in their situa­
tion. (15a;98).
A total absence of “ego” means total objectivity and total effec­
tiveness; to truly love one’s neighbor as oneself, without interference 
from one’s own ego, “means the attainment of perfect altruism, the 
elimination of all traces of egoism.” (15a;99).
Faith in modem man’s omnipotence, Schumacher says, is “wearing 
thin.” Restorations and solutions will not come from a “technological 
fix” but from within. Real and important problems can only be solved 
by using both the logical mind and our higher faculties. For
Our ordinary mind always tries to persuade us that we are 
nothing but acorns and that our greatest happiness will be to 
become bigger, fatter, shinier acorns; but that is of interest 
only to pigs. Our faith gives us knowledge of something 
much better: that we can become oak trees. (15a; 135).
The "words** of decision-makers
The above “survey” seems to indicate that these two examples of 
Buddhist decision-makers felt that people, when confronted with prob­
lems more general than shopping, invoke words, terms, concepts or 
even variables which are conspicuously absent from much of 
straightforward economic analysis.
One of the statements made by them is that the process of only-the- 
self-management leads to social contradictions.
Another notion expounded by them is that of altruism as an activity 
which is rational and quite independent of the all-encompassing self­
utility maximization theories. It is possible, they say, to engage actively 
in altruistic enterprises, thus increasing one’s own utility as well as 
others*.
Buddhist decision-makers believe, basically, that the general socio­
economic system can be workable, that harmony can exist, and that, 
with good government, “problems” can be solvable. A part of their vi­
sion is due to a belief in individuals—their strength and resourceful­
ness, their underlying mindfulness and rough rationality—a belief that 
those who create problems can find solutions.
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This ideal compares with economists’ often-held view that problems 
originate with a mistaken formula or an undiscovered resource, or that 
solutions lie in print-outs or correct formulas in the well-articulated 
social and scientific laboratory.
The task of the individual Buddhist decision-maker, then, when 
problems arise, is to set the situation aright through the instigation of 
some action based on a moral, ethical, or “religious” belief, faith, and 
confidence in the feasibility and success of action.
The principle of dharma rouses us to a recognition of 
spiritual realities not by abstention from the world but by 
bringing to this life, its business (artha) and its pleasures 
(kama), the controlling power of spiritual faith. Life is one, 
and in it there is no distinction of sacred and secular. 
(14;105).
As the humanists tell us, a person is much more than a transmuter of 
economic commodities. Participation in the economic sphere need not 
overwhelm an ethical personality. In addition to work-a-day activity, 
an ordinary individual may devote time and energy to non-economic 
and spiritual pursuits which are also sources of satisfaction. The Bud­
dhist decision-makers and Buddhist economists are aware of this. (11)
Thus the words which Buddhist decision-makers use (some witting­
ly, some unwittingly) breathe of simplicity, importance, effectiveness, 
conviction, and harmony. It may be that, in the mouths of some, these 
words are devoid of substance and are simply the repetition of rhetoric 
invented a long time ago. But in the cases of most individuals, we 
believe, these words are the expression of the experience of enlighten­
ment—of the feeling that things in general can be all right and that 
most problems confronting civilizations are solvable if we and our in­
stitutions actively follow the “right path.”
The idea of “correct action,” in the sense described above, is of 
course common to all universal religions. The bearers of this idea are 
the monks, not only the Christian but also the Brahman in India, the 
Buddhist in Tibet, and the Serapis among the Egyptians. They are liv­
ing symbols of “the way” which each person, in his transcendental 
dimension, can follow in this world.
Perhaps following this path may well be what Schumacher is referr­
ing to when he says:
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The modem experiment to live without religion has failed, 
and once we have understood this, we know what our “post 
modem” tasks really are. (15a,139).
VALUES IN ECONOMICS
As we know, there is an apparent difference in the languages involv­
ed in decision-making. It is only natural to expect linguistic difficulties 
in this area. There is probably no comfortable isomorphism between 
the world of reality to which the decision refers and the language which 
is commonly used in defining both problems and solutions. This has 
been increasingly true in the 20th century where, particularly in the 
West, the language of religion, spiritual language, and the language of 
philosophy are “alienated” from the language of science.
This lack of linguistic isomorphism can lead to a partial or confused 
view of reality, to creation of mistaken or spurious categories of 
thought, to indecision, biases, and errors in decision-making. Ex­
amples of this in economics are the confusion (which Schumacher par­
ticularly noted) which comes from not distinguishing between re­
newable and non-renewable resources, and the asymmetry of our 
theories of growth which for so long dealt with expansion while neglec­
ting decay and the steady states.
This lack of isomorphism seems to be due in a large part to the lack 
of the inclusion of a values “category” in our socio-economic discus­
sions and decisions. In what follows, thus, we want to discuss one way 
in which appropriate normative elements can be introduced explicitly 
into economics. We will introduce the Buddhist elements, or “b- 
elements,” which are, in a sense, proxy-variables for values.
The Values-block
This procedure, perhaps, can best be illustrated by our giving a work­
ing view of incorporating values into macro-models. Suppose a recur­
sive model of an economy is written as follows:
Y=A+BX+CV+E 
in which
Y=a vector of endogenous variables; 
A=a matrix of constants;
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B, C=matrices of slopes;
X=a vector of exogenous economic variables;
V=a vector of value variables which have a significant effect 
on Y; and
E=the errors matrix.
V is a Value Block or, as we shall refer to it, a V-block, composed of 
variables which are not traditionally regarded as “economic” 
variables. The notion of what is an “economic” variable, as we know, 
is both subjective and impermanent. The economic variables of Ricar­
do and Malthus, for example, were quite different from those in 
Keynes* The General Theory.
The X and Y vectors are the economic variables as measured by the 
important U.S. statistical agencies: investment, consumption, savings, 
GNP, etc. The “togetherness” of these variables we call the Materialist 
Block, or the M-block.
The V-block, then, can be composed of b-elements—the yet 
unmeasured values, mores, and feelings which influence, in com­
plicated ways and with various strengths, the readings of the empirical 
values in the M-block and the variables and coefficients related to 
them.
A typical embedded equation of this “Buddhist” model then can be:
Y^a+bx+cvj+e [2]
If, for example:
y13=a quantity of automobiles demanded;




Vi=the b-element variables Patience and Mindfulness;
and if the coefficient c is significantly different from zero, we can say 
that this is a demand curve of “Buddhist** individuals for automobiles. 
For their purchases, in this example, Patience would enter on the tim­
ing of the purchase while Mindfulness would relate to the appropriate 
selection of the model. An effect would be a decrease in impulse buying 
and an increase in the need for informative advertising.
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The Content of the V-block
The content of such a V-block would naturally depend on the nature 
of the society and the economy which is modeled, on the type of objec­
tive that the model is supposed to effectuate, on the preferences and the 
sophistication of the model user, on the degree of quantitative inclina­
tions of the modeler, on willingness to create or construct proxy 
variables, on the time span, on the “globality” of the model, and so 
on.
Ideally, in a Buddhist Economics, only one variable—a constant— 
would be needed to define the V-block: enlightenment. As enlighten­
ment can not be captured by “economic language/* we use b-elements 
as the value variables. They are, then, one basis on which a workable 
normative economics can be built.
The Buddhist scriptures give us a good source of b-elements—ethical 
elements of human behavior which describe an essentially Buddhist 
type of “personality.’’ Because the Buddha was teaching different in­
dividuals with different endowments and aspirations, he gave his 
teachings in a heterogeneous way. One of these was related to ap­
propriate conduct, another related to the dharma of the four truths, 
another corresponded to the dharma of twelve causes and conditions.
It is in the Lotus Sutra (7) and the Maha-vyutpatti (3) that we found 
the paramitas which related directly to ordinary persons trying to 
follow the Buddhist path towards enlightenment. From these works, 
and from discussions of meditative instructions and experiences, we 
have derived our b-elements.
The paramitas are defined in the Buddhist Sanskrit literature as 
follows (3; 168):
1) Dana (giving, generosity, liberality);
2) Sila (perfect virtuous conduct, morality);
3) Ksanti (absolute forbearance, patience);
4) Virya (energy);
5) Dhyana (undisturbable contemplation);
6) Prajna (wisdom);
These are the six chief paramitas. The four supplementary paramitas 
are:
7) Upaya or Upaya-kaucalya (skillfulness in the choice or
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adaptation of means for conversion or succor);
8) Pranidhana (aspiration or intention);
9) Bala (strength, power); and
10) Jnana (knowledge). (3; 168)
These last four paramitas can also roughly be expressed (in order) as 
skillful means, conviction, self-reliance and education.
From our point of view, the paramitas or “six perfections” may be 
regarded as the externally given normative rules of ethical conduct 
which an aspiring Buddhist, or a bodhisattva, or a person on a Bud­
dhist path, over a period of years, will attempt to internalize (2). 
Needless to say, this process at no time and in no place was considered 
an easy one.
The attainment of Buddhahood requires the fulfilling of the 
paramitas, but their fulfillment is dependent in turn on Mindfulness— 
the practice of meditation “on the cushion” plus the behavioral expres­
sion of practice in everyday life. A bodhisattva (a person who has vow­
ed to attain enlightenment for the sake of all living beings, and tries to 
behave in daily life as if he were already a Buddha) “helps all beings 
not only to attain. . . nirvana, but also to obtain the more material ad­
vantages of happiness and welfare in the world. . .” (3; 17).
For the sake of developing a meta-economics, we “distilled” from 
the paramitas and from meditation “manuals,” where such words as 
“love,” “charity,” and “joy” appear (6, 19, 2), seven value elements: 
Mindfulness; Impartiality; Generosity; Perspective; Patience; Compas­
sion; and Perseverance. Not all of these elements, of course, can be ex­
pected to find their expression or impact in the 20th century 
marketplace! The affect of these elements will vary greatly, depending 
upon the time and place, just as their selection might vary according to 
the biases within the process.
These b-elements, then, are the normative thoughts and feelings of 
“Buddhist” people which are expressed simultaneously in decisions, ac­
tions or habits as warranted by all situations (including the economic) 
which confront them. They are the elements, in Buddhist Economics, 
which enter now the demand equation, now the supply equation. For 
example: the b-elements which most affect the demand function are
Xd=Mindfulness, Compassion, Perspective, Perseverance
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A new kind of demand equation can then be written:
Qd=fi (income, utility, price, XJ (3)
Clearly, this expression of the b-elements in the marketplace would 
show, for example, in the deletion of some commodities and the in** 
troduction of others to shoppers' lists, as well as in more mindful pur­
chasing patterns.
Working with the b-elements
The b-elements can be incorporated in a simple economic model in 
both an impressionistic and a qualitative way; they can be used for a 
discussion of broad historical tendencies of the past and of the future; 
they can be used by long-range planners (1). From the methodological 
point of view, our degree of precision reached at this theoretical level, 
we believe, would be roughly parallel to that of Smith's discussion of 
the canons of taxation, of Tawney’s hypothesis of the role on savings, 
or of Schumpeter’s theory of the success of capitalism.
Generally speaking, as we know, economists today are accustomed 
to a degree of precision in their analyses. If the language of economics 
is to blend fruitfully with the language of the V-block, the language of 
the V-block has to be enlarged in some way comparable to that which 
we have been doing.
Some economists have already gone a long way, in both their theory 
and empirical work, in dealing with broad, nebulous, and hardly 
measured variables. What follows here is some suggestions for creating 
a more comprehensive ethical variant of economics.
Direct data gathering: The content of the V-block might be obtained 
by conducting well-designed survey experiments of those who reflect 
the clearest “transcendental” attitudes and behavior—monks, yogis, 
brahmans, etc.—as to items they buy or don’t buy, and why. This 
survey could get directly at value content and might indeed be path- 
breaking, provided it is conducted with great public relations care and 
is sound both from the theoretical and statistical point of view.
Realistic Proxy Variables: The content of the V-block might be made 
up of realistic proxy variables: “nearly” economic data which have 
dimensions with which economists are familiar. As usual, the variables 
might be constructed from already available data on anticipations, 
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aspirations or sentiments (20), or, in the extreme, they could be assign­
ed quantitative values by some kind of an expert-survey procedure in 
which the “best” measure can be discovered. For example, consump­
tion expenditure could be reconstituted from available GNP data so as 
to reflect the would-have-been consumption expenditure of a “Bud­
dhist” person, by deletion or by the subtraction of the expenditures on 
red meat, alcohol, unnecessary furniture, and cosmetics.
Pedagogical proxy variables: The content of the V-block might be 
simulated by quantifying, in an arbitrary way, a convenient and ap­
propriate postulate or assumption. For example, the postulates of Bud­
dhist Economics can be put in two ways—strongly and simply, or more 
weakly but in detail. The simple statement has two variants:
Sj A person behaves in such a way so as to benefit all 
beings—past, present, and future—but not himself. (This is 
the description of the behavior of a Buddha.)
Si A person behaves in such a way so as to benefit all pre­
sent beings, including himself. (This is a norm of behavior 
for a Bodhisattva.)
In such a simulation exercise, in 1979, we worked with a model by 
Dr. Frederick Kile (at that time of the Aid Association for Lutherans) 
called the Integrated World Model or IWM. This model was quite ex­
tensively described in the literature generally available to systems and 
cybernetics people and one of its roots was a concern with global model­
ing.
IWM did not contain a V-block as we have defined it above. Rather, 
it contained a “value module” expressed in quantitative terms. This 
module was a series of FORTRAN statements written by the modeler 
which expressed his view of the way in which a value judgment 
manifests itself in material or economic terms. A “change in values” 
resulted in the change in the value of the resulting difference coeffi­
cients.
In most cases, the chief items of the value module were:
CLASS—the original index of per capita well-being—an in­
dex of twenty variables ranging from 0.0 to 1.0; and 
MODE—a number which takes on three values. Mode enters 
some of the equations as follows:
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QUANTITY DEMANDED OF G D “A”=MODE (DE­
MAND EQUATION FOR GOOD “A”)
The variation in the differential coefficients in the equations, and the 
changes in CLASS and MODE, made for the difference between a Nor­
mal Run and a Policy or Simulation Run.
In preparation for our simulation experiment, the MODE was 
lowered for the following Demand Equations:
zero GNP (a special control coefficient distinct from MODE); 
low birth rate (a special purpose, experimental coefficient); 
low mobile transportation equipment and supplies;
low consumption of durable common goods;
low expenditure on new housing;
low expenditure on the military.
These changes expressed, for our purposes, an adaptive interpreta­
tion of what seemed to be a desideratum on the part of Buddhist deci­
sion-makers or an expression of what is sometimes referred to as 
“voluntary simplicity” (9).
The results obtained (Id; 13-14) were clearly conditioned by the then 
present structure of the American economy and by the definitions 
which comprised the testing procedure. Our strong conclusion was that 
a “value” driven model will chart a Simulation Run different than a 
Normal Run. As far as we know, this had not been shown in this par­
ticular way heretofore.
CONCLUSION
The objective of this paper has been to discuss some demand aspects 
of Buddhist Economics, with a view of relating them to traditional 
economics, to the mutual development of both. The objective of this 
paper is not to advocate anything—the creation of a “just society,” an 
appeal for right or wrong, a return to “early ideals”—but it is to at­
tempt to illustrate the possibility and even the necessity of the inclusion 
of values in economic discussions and resulting decisions.
Our language, our tools, our methods, and our solution-bringing 
techniques define the problems we wish to attack in real and in intellec­
tual life. This is as true of other areas as of economics. Economics, 
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however, is in a “fortunate” position; it is both a theory and a techni­
que with a reality check imposed upon it.
Buddhism, as other philosophies and religions, also has a concept of 
the ideal. The Buddhist notion or definition of the ideal starts internal­
ly—as a small point deep within a person’s heart—and “many 
lifetimes” are to be devoted to the reaching of that ideal. In contrast, 
the Western notion of the ideal is often more external, material, cor­
poreal, and instantaneous.
In this paper, in our discussion of “ideal” motives and values, we 
have illustrated how the pursuit of “transcendental” goals can act as 
both a motive and an incentive to economic activity. In our times, the 
pursuit of an ethical motive may very well be less zealous than the pur­
suit of those two “materialistic” motives of profit and utility; but 
historical experience seems to suggest that prices and quantities can be 
formed, decisions are made, and trade can take place even in the 
absence of these latter concepts.
We believe that Buddhist decision making would lead to a more 
satisfactory performance of the economic system. Economic systems 
fail, in the final analysis, not just because they can not generate enough 
bread or wheat (or can generate too much), but because they either free 
or tame the minds of men too much.
Economics was meant to be both ethical and useful. It must speak 
the language of the users. A Buddhist Economics might help us all to 
work with current and future situations and could reflect the concerns 
of an ever-growing number of the world’s population.
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